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STUDENT COMMENTS
THE CHILD CARE DEDUCTION: ISSUES RAISED BY
MICHAEL AND ELIZABETH NAMMACK AND THE
PENDING AMENDMENT TO SECTION 214
An imminent Tax Court case' has provoked public attention be-
cause of its focus on Section 214 of the Internal Revenue Code
1 Michael T. and Elizabeth B. Nammack, No. 1929-67 (Tax Court, filed April 19,
1967).
2 Int. Rev. Code of 1954, § 214, provides:
(a) General rule.—There shall be allowed as a deduction expenses paid
during the taxable year by a taxpayer who is a woman or widower, or is a
husband whose wife is incapacitated or is institutionalized, for the care of one
or more dependents (as defined in subsection (d) (1)), but only if such care is
for the purpose of enabling the taxpayer to be gainfully employed.
(b) Limitations.—
(1) Dollar limit.—
(A) Except as provided in subparagraph (B), the deduction under
subsection (a) shall not exceed $600 for any taxable year.
(B) The $600 limit of subparagraph (A) shall be increased (to an
amount not above $900) by the amount of expenses incurred by the
taxpayer for any period during which the taxpayer had 2 or more
dependents.
(2) Working wives and husbands with incapacitated wives.—In the
case of a woman who is married and in the case of a husband whose wife
is incapacitated, the deduction under subsection (a)—
(A) shall not be allowed unless the taxpayer and his spouse file a
joint return for the taxable year, and
(B) shall be reduced by the amount (if any) by which the ad-
justed gross income of the taxpayer and his spouse exceeds $6,000.
This paragraph shall not apply, in the case of a woman who is married, to
expenses incurred while her husband is incapable of self-support because
mentally or physically defective, or, in the case of a husband whose wife is
incapacitated, to expenses incurred while his wife is institutionalized if such
institutionalization is for a period of at least 90 consecutive days (whether
or not within one taxable year) or a shorter period if terminated by her
death.
(3) Certain payments not taken into account—Subsection (a) shall
not apply to any amount paid to an individual with respect to whom the
taxpayer is allowed for his taxable year a deduction under section 151 (re-
lating to deductions for personal exemptions).
(c) Special rule where wife is incapacitated or institutionalized.—In the
case of a husband whose wife is incapacitated or is institutionalized, the deduc-
duction under subsection (a) shall be allowed only for expenses incurred
while the wife was incapacitated or institutionalized (as the case may be) for
a period of at least 90 consecutive days (whether or not within one taxable year)
or a shorter period if terminated by her death.
(d) Definitions.—For purposes of this section—
(1) Dependent.—The term "dependent" means a person with respect
to whom the taxpayer is entitled to an exemption under section 151(e) (1)-
(A) who has not attained the age of 13 years and who (within the
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Section 214 allows a deduction, popularly called the child care de-
duction, for costs incurred in the care of certain dependents, including
adults unable to care for themselves as well as children. The deduc-
tion is available only to certain classes of taxpayers for expenses
incurred in order to seek or hold employment. Its availability is
limited further by statutory restrictions on the total amount deduct-
ible and by the total joint income of working married couples who
may claim the deduction.
Petitioner Elizabeth Nammack seeks court relief from the $600
limit imposed on her deduction for the care of one dependent, claim-
ing a deduction for the full cost of child care, $2860, that she in-
curred in order to hold a $4934 job.B She apparently will argue that
child care is not a unique category of expense whose deductibility is
subject to the arbitrary dollar limits imposed by section 214, but is
rather a form of business expense and therefore should be subject
only to the limitation of reasonableness imposed on business ex-
penses."' It appears that she will also argue that the dollar limits of
section 214 cause unconstitutional treatment of women: since women
are customarily charged with the care of children, such limits operate
to deny them equal opportunity with men to seek and hold employ-
ment.
A comparable constitutional question is raised by the pending
appeal of another Tax Court case, Charles E. Moritz.5 Taxpayer
the meaning of section 152) is a son, stepson, daughter, or step-
daughter of the taxpayer; or
(B) who is physically or mentally incapable of caring for himself.
(2) Widower.—The term "widower" includes an unmarried individual
who is legally separated from his spouse under a decree of divorce or of
separate maintenance.
(3) Incapacitated wife.—A wife shall be considered incapacitated only
(A) while she is incapable of caring for herself because mentally or physi-
cally defective, or (B) while she is institutionalized.
(4) Institutionalized wife.--A wife shall be considered institutionalized
only while she is, for the purpose of receiving medical care or treatment,
an inpatient, resident, or inmate of a public or private hospital, sanitarium,
or other similar institution.
(5) Determination of status.—A woman shall not be considered as married
If—
(A) she is legally separated from her spouse under a decree of
divorce or of separate maintenance at the close of the taxable year, or
(B) she has been deserted by her spouse, does not know his where-
abouts (and has not known his whereabouts at any time during the
taxable year), and has applied to a court of competent jurisdiction
for appropriate process to compel him to pay support or otherwise
to comply with the law or a judicial order, as determined under
regulations prescribed by the Secretary or his delegate.
Petitioner's Brief at 1-4, 22-29, 37-55. See also Boston Globe, May 26, 1971, at 22,
col, 1,
4 See text infra at notes 11-14 for discussion of the business expense deduction.
6 55 T.C. No. 14 (Oct. 22, 1970), on appeal to the 10th Circuit, discussed in Note,
Sex and the Single Man: Discrimination in the Dependent Caro Deduction, 5 Valpariso
L. Rev. 415 (1971).
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Moritz is a male, past and present unmarried; the deduction he
claims for the care of an invalid mother is allowed to any single
woman or widowed or divorced man but is not available to males of
his class." The denial of the deduction, he argues, constitutes a vio-
lation of due process.
The questions raised in both cases appear especially urgent in
light of recent congressional action on section 214. Unamended since
1964, it has been the target of at least thirteen bills introduced in
the 92d Congress, 7
 and, as this comment is written, the House has
passed an amendment to the statute as part of H.R. 1, the major
social security-welfare bill. The amendment would raise both the
dollar limit of the available deduction and the limit on the joint in-
come of working couples who may claim the whole deduction,' but it
includes none of the sweeping changes proposed by several of the
thirteen bills bypassed by Ways and Means in favor of H.R. 1. One
of those bills recommended allowing the deduction as a business ex-
pense,' while others proposed removing all limitations on eligibility
and on the amount deductible.'" Hence, the pending amendment sug-
gests a negative legislative response to the issues raised by the Nam-
mack and Moritz cases.
This comment will examine various grounds for judicial response
to the issues suggested by the Nammack petition and the Moritz ap-
peal. It will consider the possibility of judicial reclassification of child
care costs as a business expense and of judicial finding that treat-
ment of certain classes of taxpayers is unconstitutional. It will also
consider the legislative policy underlying section 214, analyze the
effectiveness of the present statute and the pending amendment as
instruments of that policy, and note several alternatives to the pend-
ing amendment.
6
 Int. Rev. Code of 1954,
	 214(a), (d) (2).
7
 S. 1632, H.R. 118, H.R. 845, H.R. 1478, H.R. 3608, H.R. 3991, H.R. 4206,
H.R. 4371, H.R. 6377, H.R. 7026, H.R. 7283, H.R. 7622: all bills of the 92d Cong., 1st
Sess. (1971).
8
 H.R. 1, 92d Cong., 1st Sess. (A Bill to Amend the Social Security Act) was passed
by the House on June 22, 1971. Title V, pt. D, Liberalization of Income Tax Treatment
of Child Care Expenses and Retirement Income, would raise the limits on the deduction
from the currently allowed $600 for one dependent and $900 for more than one, to $750
for one dependent, $1125 for two dependents, and $1500 for three or more. It would
also raise from $6000 to $lzpoo the limit on joint income of working couples who may
claim the full deduction. The deduction to which such a couple would otherwise be
entitled would be reduced by one dollar for every dollar of joint Income above the
statutory limit.
9 H.R. 118, 92d Cong., 1st Sess. (1971).
to H.R. 3608 proposed extending the deduction to men who are not married; H.R.
4206 and H.R. 4371 proposed eliminating the joint income ceiling; H.R. 6377 proposed
eliminating limits on eligibility and on amounts deductible. All of these are bills of the
92d Cong., 1st Sess. (1971).
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I. CHILD CARE COSTS: BUSINESS OR PRIRSONAL?
The Nammack argument rests on the reclassification of child
care costs as business rather than personal expenses and hence de-
ductible under the broad provisions of section 162. That section im-
plements the fundamental tax policy of taxing only net income" by
allowing the deduction of all "ordinary and necessary" expenses paid
or incurred during the taxable year in carrying on any trade or busi-
ness." A fundamental corollary to that policy is found in Section 262,
which provides that no deduction shall be allowed for personal, living,
or family expenses except as otherwise expressly provided in the
Code." Section 166 explicitly subjects all business and trade deduc-
tions to the section 262 rule." The only exceptions to that rule, a
series of quasi-personal deductions allowed for various policy reasons,
are grouped together at sections 213-217." Successive legislative
amendments, administrative regulations and court interpretations have
consistently implemented both the basic policy and its corollary."
Unfortunately for petitioners such as Mrs. Nammack, neither
direct precedent from the child care decisions, nor analogy with the
tests and decisions of other cases classifying business and personal
expenses, nor the legislative history of section 214 suggests grounds for
classifying the cost of child care as a business expense.
11 See, e.g., Commissioner v. Teller, 383 U.S. 687, 691 (1966); see commentary in
Ellett and Rubinstein, Disallowed Deductions: 1969 Tax Reform Act Changes to Code
Sec. 162, 48 Taxes 457 (1970).
12 Int. Rev. Code of 1954, § 162(a). Section 212 provides a similar deduction for
ordinary and necessary expenses paid or incurred (I) for the production or collection of
income; (2) for the management, conservation or maintenance of property held for the
production of income; or (3) in connection with the determination, collection, or
refund of any tax.
13
 Int. Rev. Code of 1954, § 262.
14 Int. Rev. Code of 1954, § 161 provides, in part:
In computing taxable income ... there shall be allowed as deductions the items
specified in this part, subject to the exceptions provided in part IX (sec. 261
and following, relating to items not deductible) (emphasis added).
Section 211 establishes the same qualification for 9 212 deduction of expenses in-
curred for the production of income.
15 See text at notes 40 and 41 infra.
16 For a discussion of both the policy and the corollary and their interpretation and
application, see, e.g., United States v. Gilmore, 372 U.S. 39 (1963). Speaking for the
majority, Justice Harlan noted that:
For income tax purposes Congress has seen fit to regard an individual as
having two personalities: "one is [as] a seeker after profit who can deduct the
expenses incurred in that search; the other is [as] a creature satisfying his needs
as a human . . . but who cannot deduct such consumption and related ex-
penditures." Id. at 44.
The Supreme Court has ignored net income policy only when the allowance of the
deduction in question would frustrate sharply defined public policy. See Tank Truck
Rentals, Inc. v. Commissioner, 356 U.S. 30 (1958). But cf. Ellett and Rubinstein, note 11
supra.
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A. Direct Precedent: Henry C. Smith and Successors
Prior to the initial granting in 1954 of a deduction for child care
costs, such costs were classified as "personal" in Henry C. Smith."
The petitioners in that case sought the deduction as a business/trade
expense's for the cost incurred in hiring nursemaids to care for their
child, arguing that but for the nursemaid's services Mrs. Smith would
have been unable to earn taxable income. The court upheld disallow-
ance of the deduction by (1) classifying the expense as personal and
therefore nondeductible pursuant to the predecessor's of present
section 262; and (2) rejecting it as a business expense on the ground
that meeting the "but for" test was inadequate qualification for busi-
ness expense status.
The Smith court's test for finding a personal expense looked to
its essence: was the expense of a "personal . . . nature, of a character
applicable to human beings generally, and which exist[s] on that plane
regardless of the occupation . . . of the individuals concerned [ ? ]
The care of children, "like similar aspects of family and household
life," was found to be personal under this test. The only ground on
which costs for such care could qualify as a business expense, the fact
that but for those costs the taxpayer could not have engaged in her
trade, was decisively rejected.' In subsequent cases classifying other
types of expenses as business or personal, both the Smith court's test
for a personal expense and its rejection of the "but for" test have been
followed.'
The Smith classification was not altered by introduction of the
Section 214 deduction in the 1954 Code. In Kenneth S. King," the
taxpayer, a deserted husband, conceded that during the year for which
he sought a deduction for the cost of nursing home care for his infant
child, he had failed to meet the section 214 requirement that he be
divorced from his wife. A deduction under that statute was therefore
not available to him. He contended, however, that the sum was de-
ductible as a business expense, since the expense had been a necessary
prerequisite to his employment. The court rejected the contention,
relying on Smith" to hold that the expense was not an ordinary and
IT Henry C. Smith v. Commissioner, 40 E.T.A. 1038 (1939), aff'd per curiam, 113
F.2d 114 (2d Cir. 1940).
18 The deduction was sought under Int. Rev. Code of 1939 4 23(a) (1), the
predecessor to § 162 of the 1954 Code.
11) Int. Rev. Code of 1939,	 24(a) (1).
20 40 B.T.A. at 1039-40.
21 Id. at 1039.
22 See Commissioner v. Moran, 236 F.2d 595, 597 (8th Cir. 1956); Simenstad v.
United States, 325 F. Supp. 1249, 1252 (N.D. Cal. 1971); Fred W. Amend Co., 55 T.C.
No. 31 (Nov. 19, 1970); Richard Walter Drake, 52 T.C. 842, 844 (1969) (all citing
Smith).
28 19 CCH Tax Ct. Mem. 1519 (1960).
24 The court also relied on Mildred A. O'Connor, 6 T.C. 323 (1946), the test case
seeking deduction of child care costs under 212. In that case the expense was found to
be personal and thus disallowed in a holding relying upon Smith.
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necessary business expense and that it was a personal expense ex-
plicitly not deductible under section 262.
Child care cases between King and the pending Nammack peti-
tion have not questioned the nature of the expense. The decisions
have looked only to the terms of section 214, disallowing the deduc-
tion whenever those terms are not met, that is, whenever taxpayer's
status varies from that prescribed by the statute' Such decisions
reflect unanimous classification of the child care expense as personal,
hence deductible only to the extent allowed by legislative grace in
section 214.
B. Tests Used in Analogous Classification Cases:
Correlation with the Smith Test
No test currently used in classifying other kinds of expenses as
either business or personal would permit a categorization of child care
costs different from that found in Smith. The current "origins" test
used for litigation expenses" correlates with both Smith tests, by re-
jecting as a standard for business/trade status the income-producing
or -diminishing outcome of the litigation. The "proximate relation or
connection" standard, frequently used as a test for the business travel
deduction under section 162 (a) (2), also looks to the essential origin
of the activity for which expenses were incurred. This test demands a
distinctly business exigency requiring that activity."
Both the origins and the proximate relation tests permit deducti-
bility of expenditures for items that may initially appear personal.
For example, popular comments on the Nammack case find the busi-
ness yacht less worthy of deductibility than the costs of child care."
The latter, however, originate in a personal/family need or relation-
ship, the need of the child or aged parent for his parent's or relative's
26 E.g., Alvin J. Linton, 30 CCH Tax Ct. Mem. 88 (1971) (deduction denied to
husband still legally married to his wife at the end of the year); Betty C. Bosher, 30
CCH Tax Ct. Mem. 57 (1971) (deduction denied to working divorced mother because
she had not shown that she was entitled to claim her three children as dependents).
20 See United States v. Gilmore, 372 U.S. 39, 48-49 (1963); and Woodward v.
Commissioner, 397 U.S. 572 (1970). In Woodward, the Court stated that:
A test based upon the taxpayer's "purpose" in undertaking ... litigation would
encourage resort to formalisms and artificial distinctions .... Further, a standard
based on the origin of the claim litigated comports with this Court's recent
ruling ... in United States v. Gilmore.... The Court rejected a test that looked
to the consequences of the litigation, and did not even consider the taxpayer's
motives or purposes in undertaking defense . . . but rather examined the origin
and character of the claim ... and found• that the claim arose out of the per-
sonal relationship of marriage (emphasis added).
Id. at 577-78. Cf. critical discussion of Woodward and the origins test in Gibbs, Legal
Fees: Supreme Court Cases Requiring Capitalization Will Have Broad Impact, 33
J. Taxation 201 (1970).
27 See, e.g., Commissioner v. Flowers, 326 U.S. 465, 470, 473-74 (1946) (applying
the 1939 Code's predecessor of present § 162); Williams v. Patterson, 286 F.2d 333, 339-
40 (5th Cir. 1961).
28 See, e.g., Boston Globe, May 26, 1971, at 22, col. 1.
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care; the cost of the yacht originates in a need of the business. Assum-
ing that the taxpayer can show such an expenditure as ordinary and
necessary in his business, it will be deductible under section 162 even
though the yacht brings personal pleasure to the taxpayer's customers
or corporate officers." By the same tests, expenses incurred by the
employer for meals and lodging provided to employees for the em-
ployer's convenience are of course deductible by the employer, since
their origin lies in his business requirements, even though the food
and shelter are then applied to the employee's personal needs." On
the other hand, such expenses as those incurred for "commuting,
clothing, and a baby sitter for a working mother . . . [though] neces-
sary to an individual's occupation ..." are not deductible because they
originate in personal need or choice.'
C. Educational And Travel Expenses Deductible Under Section 162
Certain costs are treated by tax law as business expenses despite
their apparently personal nature; some educational costs and expendi-
tures for food and lodging on business trips are the most familiar
examples. Neither, however, provides an analogy adequate to justify
reclassification of child care costs, since both have been distinguished
from the profit-motivated but personal expenditures disallowed by
section 262. Only those educational expenses incurred to meet the
requirements of a present occupation were deductible under the 1939
and 1954 Codes." in 1967, new regulations disallowed even those
expenses incurred to maintain or improve skills required by the indi-
viduals's current employment or trade, or to meet the express require-
ments of the employer, if at the same time the expenses served to
provide primarily personal benefits to the taxpayer." A recent Seventh
29 See, e.g., International Artists, Ltd., 55 T.C. No. 12 (Oct. 22, 1970), citing Smith
in evaluation of the origin of the expenses incurred in constructing a home for
Liberace.
88
 A series of motelkeepers' cases illustrates the distinction nicely. In Commissioner
v. Moran, 236 F.2d 595, 597 (8th Cir. 1956), petitioners, partners whose hotel business
required their constant presence, sought to deduct the living costs allocable to their
having to stay at the hotel. The court admitted the trade/business connection of the
costs but held that they were nonetheless personal in nature and therefore disallowed
under § 262. Application of the "convenience of the employer" rule would classify the
expenses as originating from the employer's business needs and not petitioners' personal
needs; but since a partnership was not then recognized in tax law as an entity distinct
from "partner-employees," the "convenience of the employer" rule was unavailable. In
accord are Commisioner v. Robinson, 273 F.2d 503 (3d Cir. 1959) and Commissioner
v. Doak, 234 F.2d 704 (4th Cir. 1956).
81 Carroll v. Commissioner, 418 F.2d 91, 95 (7th Cir. 1969).
32 An educational expense was first allowed as a business deduction in Hill v.
Commissioner, 181 F.2d 906, 908 (4th Cir. 1950). The court there held the costs de-
ductible after looking to their origin in a Virginia Code provision which required that
the taxpayer undertake the education involved in order to renew the teaching
certificate necessary to retain her job. Treas. Reg. § 1.162-5 as adopted by T.D. 6291
(1958).
88 Treas. Reg. 1 1.162-5, as amended by T.D. 6918 (1967), disallows the deduction
if the education involved is necessary to meet the minimum educational requirements
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Circuit case noted that the disallowed expenses were analogous to the
"necessary" but fundamentally personal .costs: of commuting or
clothing."
The fact that costs of meals and lodging on business trips are
deductible under section 162 would seem,to be proof that essentially
personal expenditures can be transformed into business expenses by
establishing a profit motivation. Yet the administrative history of the
meal and lodging deduction distinguishes it from other similar costs
and justifies its escaping the prohibition of section 262. Originally, the
deduction was granted only for the costs of meals and lodging incurred
in excess of what the taxpayer would have had to pay at borne. The
cost of satisfying personal needs was not deductible; but a deduction
was allowed for the additional expense originating from the business
trip, that is, for the difference between the cost of meals on the road
and that of meals at home." Only the obvious administrative problems
provoked by this rule prompted the current, more workable, regulation
which allows deduction for all meals and lodging costs incurred on a
business trip away from home."
A second requirement, the "duplicative rule," is an even clearer
indication of the congressional intent to grant deduction for only
those meals and lodging costs originating from the exigencies of the
business trip. Taxpayers must maintain a permanent home or its
equivalent in order to deduct for travel meals and lodging; otherwise
such meals and lodging originate with personal needs for whose
satisfaction the taxpayer has not otherwise provided."
D. The Legislative History of Section 214
The legislative history of section 214 apparently leaves no room
for innovative court interpretation of child care costs as a business
expense." The single statement in the committee reports that could be
for qualification in taxpayer's employment, or if It will lead to qualifying him in a new
trade or business. The costs incurred for such education are.ruled to be either personal,
or an inseparable aggregate of personal and capital, expenditures.
84 Carroll v. Commissioner, 418 F,2d 91, 95 (7th Cir. 1969). For discussion of the
new regulation see Comment, The Deductibility of Educational Expenses: Administrative
Construction of Statute, 17 Buff. L. Rev. 182 (1967).
as Rosenspan v. United States, 316 F. Supp. 194, 197 (E.D.N.V. 1970). See also
United States v. Correll, 389 U.S. 299, 302-05 (1967), upholding the Commissioner's
construaI of "away from home" to exclude all trips except those requiring rest or sleep.
The Court noted the significantly higher costs of such trips as a probable reason for
congressional intention to allow such expenses as a "direct result . of business travel",
while disallowing commuting expenses. See also Annot., 19 L. Ed. 2d 1416 (1967).
88 Rosenspan v. United States, 316 F. Supp. 194, 197 nn.3, 5 (E.D,N.Y. 1970)
provides a convenient summary of the regulations involved.
87 United States v. Correll, 389 U.S. 299, 305 n.18 (1967). For a concise summary of
the development of the duplicative rule, see Rosenspan v. United States, 316 F. Supp. 194,
198 (E.D.N.Y. 1970).
38 Cf. Commissioner v. Bi!der, 369 U.S. 499, 504-05 (1962), ruling that since the
legislative history revealed an unmistakable congressional purpose, and since the statute
involved (§ 213) could reasonably be construed to reflect this-legislative purpose, any
other interpretation was foreclosed.
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grounds for reclassification, "a widow or widower with young children
must incur these expenses in order to earn a livelihood and . . . they,
therefore, are comparable to an employee's business expenses,' is
silenced by the position of Section 214 in the Code, by the declared
congressional policy behind it, and finally, by its own restrictive terms.
When the deduction was first granted in 1954, it was placed in
Part VII of the Code as part of a series of apparently personal ex-
penses made deductible as express exceptions to the prohibition of
Section 262." As exceptions to the rule, they represented "a policy
judgment as to a particular class of expenditures otherwise nondeduc-
tible, like extraordinary medical expenses, . . . [but they did] not cast
any doubt on the basic tax structure set up by Congress”"—that is,
on such essential policies as the business/personal distinction.
The 1954 committee reports specify as the intended recipients of
the deduction widows and widowers and "low income families,
[wherein] the earnings of the mother are essential for the maintenance
of minimum living standards, even when the father is also employed
"42 The emphasis here, as in the reports on the 1963 and 1964
amendments, is on providing a limited amount of relief for the specified
classes of persons." Finally, the terms of the deduction as originally
granted and as amended in 1963 and 1964" are so restrictive that it
39 H. R. Rep. No. 1337, 113c1 Cong., 2d Sess. 30 (1954); S. Rep. No. 1622, 83d
Cong., 2d Sess. 36 (1954).
40 Int. Rev. Code of 1954, ch. 1, pt. VII: fl 213 (medical expenses), 214 (child-
care), 215 (alimony), 216 (that portion of a cooperative housing corporation tenant-
stockholder's payments that are allocable to taxes, interest, etc.), 217 (moving expenses).
See § 262: "Except as otherwise expressly provided in this chapter, no deduction shall
be allowed for personal, living or family expenses." See also Treas. Reg. § 1.262-1 (c)
(1954) for a cross reference to the exceptional deductions.
41 United States v. Gilmore, 372 U.S. 39, 48 n.16 (1963), regarding the enactment
of § 212(3) allowing deduction for expenses of contesting tax liability, apparently also
applicable to the other deductions in this part of the Code.
42 S. Rep. No. 1622, 83d Cong., 2d Sess. 36 (1954).
43
 For example, the report accompanying the 1964 House proposal to raise the
dollar limit to $900 for two or more dependents argued that the raised deduction should
not be made available to working couples but allowed only to single women or wives with
incapacitated husbands. H.R. Rep. No. 749, 88th Cong., 2d Sess. (1964), U.S. Code
Cong. & Ad. News 1366-67 (1964). The Senate's proposals were more liberal but stressed
"carry[ing] out the original intetition of Congress" by covering "the average case
where the wife has found it necessary to supplement the husband's income by working"
(emphasis added). S. Rep. No. 830, 88th Cong., 2d Sess. (1964), U.S. Code Cong. & Ad.
News 1741 (1964). See also S. Rep. No. 69, 88th Cong., 1st Sess. (1963), U.S. Code
Cong. & Ad. News 618-19 (1963).
44 See supra note 2 for text of § 214. The 1963 amendment made the deduction
available to a wife who has been deserted by her husband on the same basis as to a
single woman, Pub. L. No. 88-4, 0 1, 77 Stat. 4 (1963). In 1964 it was made available
to husbands with incapacitated or institutionalized wives; the joint income limit for
availability of the full deduction was raised from $4500 to $6000; the dollar limit was
raised from a flat $600 to $600 for the care of one dependent and $900 for care of
more than one; and the age of a child for whose care the deduction could be taken was
raised from under 12 to under 13 years of age. Pub. L. 88-272, tit. II, 11 212(a), 78
Stat. 49 (1964).
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is impossible to argue that they were ever intended to cover the true
costs of child care for any full-time worker lacking access to a sub-
sidized day-care center, nursing home, or unusually inexpensive baby-
sitters ."
The congressional intention behind section 214, then, was to
encourage employment among certain classes of taxpayers whose re-
sponsibility for children or older dependents would otherwise preclude
their employment. It is possible—although the record is silent on this
point—that a subordinate intention was to discourage single female
beneficiaries from going on welfare and to encourage the wife of a
low-income family to work rather than apply for aid after a real or
fictitious separation from her husband." In any case, the restrictive
terms seem to indicate that the deduction was granted as a social
welfare measure rather than as an economic-growth measure intended
to stimulate employment among all classes of taxpayers. 4t Thus, the
possibility of a judicial finding of legislative intent to treat child care
costs as a business expense seems to be precluded.
II. THE CONSTITUTIONAL ARGUMENT
The constitutional arguments suggested by the Nammack and
Moritz cases appear to offer little ground for judicial relief from the
present restrictions of section 214. The courts have consistently held
that classifications established by Congress under its plenary taxing
power are constitutional, no matter how inequitable, so long as
Congress treats alike an entire class of citizens." The classic summary
of this doctrine is found in Brushaber v. Union Pacific, where the
majority stated that only if "the act complained of was so arbitrary as
to constrain to the conclusion that it was not . . . taxation but a con-
fiscation of property ... or, what is equivalent thereto, was so wanting
in basis for classification as to produce such a gross and patent in-
45 See text at notes 52 et seq. infra. The minority report recommended that the
deduction be at least $1200 per year, H.R. Rep.,No. 1337, supra note 39, at 1310.
40
 This conjecture is supported by the report accompanying the pending amendment
to 214, H.R. Rep. No. 231, 92d Cong,, 1st Sess. 6 (1971):
The income tax changes included in this bill are closely associated with the
social security and welfare provisions . . . . One of the income tax changes
liberalizes the deduction for child care expenses where there is a working mother.
This will be of primary benefit to those in the relatively !ow income levels and
is in line with other provisions ... which provide for child services and en-
courage those receiving welfare payments to obtain employment.
47 Nowhere does the legislative history of § 214 reveal any notable interest in tax
gains to be realized from higher employment encouraged by the statute. The strongest
statement on that point was made in H.R. Rep. No. 231, supra note 46, at 237:
"The annual revenue cost of these changes [liberalization of the child care deduction' is
expected to be approximately $75 million. This does not take into account any expan-
sion in the work force stimulated by this credit."
4 B See, e.g., Justice Douglas in United States v. Skelly Oil Co.: "The search for
equity in the tax laws is wondrous and elusive. As Edmond Cahn said: '[T]hose only
are equal whom the law has elected to equalize.' " 394 U.S. 678, 687 (1969) (dissenting
opinion).
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equality as to inevitably lead to the same conclusion" could a tax
classification be found so unreasonable as to constitute denial of due
process." Since section 214 operates against women only in the sense
that it limits tax relief for a burden imposed on them not by law but
by nature and/or culture—the personal care of dependents—it hardly
falls within the Brushaber category as a denial of due process to
women. Taxpayer Moritz might seem to have a stronger case, but a
corollary to the Brushaber rule is that even an apparently arbitrary
classification will not be disturbed if the congressional record shows a
reasonable legislative intention." The legislative history and terms of
section 214 reveal a persistent attempt to help women primarily." The
fact that the help provided to women is not more extensive while
similar help is chivalrously denied to a certain class of males may be
inequitable but not unconstitutional. The remedy for those protesting
inequitable classification, the courts have ever pointed out, lies with
Congress.
III. SECTION 214 AND THE PENDING AMENDMENT AS
INSTRUMENTS OF POLICY
The policy that section 214 is intended to implement has been
described above: the deduction was designed to enable certain women-
and certain classes of men similarly situated—to work despite the
responsibility for. dependents requiring personal care.52 In essence,
then, the deduction was intended as a subsidy to fill a particular need
rather than as an instrument of general tax policy. A review - of the
legislative history reveals clearly that the child care deduction was
designed as a subsidy. •
In 1954 the House initially proposed allowing the deduction only
for the care of children under ten, and making it available only to
widows, widowers and women whose husbands are incapable of work-
ing and who "must incur" child care expenses "in order to earn a
livelihood." 55 The foregoing language emphasizes necessity, not choice;
earning a livelihood, not the right to work." The Senate extended the
49 Brushaber v. Union Pacific R.R. 240 U.S. 1, 24-25 (1916).
50 See, e.g., Johnston v. Commicsioner, 429 F.2d 804, 806-07 (6th Cir. 1970).
51 The Senate Committee's rejection of the Kerr-Smith amendment, which would
have allowed the deduction to all taxpayers alike, including single men, was noted by
the court in Moths. 55 T.C. No. 14 (Oct. 22, 1970), citing Hearings on H.R. 8300
Before the Senate Comm. on Finance, 83d Cong., 2d Sess. 1798 (1954).
But see Petitioner's Brief at 41, where it is argued that § 214(b) discriminates
against working women with children both in its demonstrated effects and in its
underlying purpose. Petitioner contends that both its. provisions and the legislative hear-
ings and reports disclose in § 214 "a Congressional conviction that married women
should remain at home and care for their children rather than pursue gainful employ-
ment, that the opportunity to work should be reserved to men unless it is absolutely
necessary for the woman to work."
52 See text at notes 42-46 supra.
52 H. R. Rep. No. 1337, supra note 39,- at 30.
54 Cf. Staff of the House Comm. on Ways and Means, 86th Cong., 1st Sess., Tax
Revision Compendium thereinafter cited as Tax Revision Compendium'. "The limited
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deduction to working wives of "low-income families, [where] the
earnings of the mother are essential for the maintenance of minimum
living standards. . . ."" The Kerr-Smith amendment, which would
have extended the deduction to all taxpayers alike," was rejected.
When in 1963 and 1964 the statute was liberalized, both the limited
nature of the changes" and the committee reports" reflected adher-
ence to the original policy. Finally, only one term of the presently
pending amendment, a sharp increase in the joint income ceiling, which
would make the deduction available to working couples with joint
incomes of $12,000," suggests even a modest modification of original
congressional intent. The other terms of the proposal," the language
of the committee report, 6' and the location of the amendment in a
major piece of social security-welfare legislation are indications of a
continuing legislative classification of the deduction as a social subsidy.
When section 214 was first enacted, the minority report noted
that the amount of the benefit was "almost too small to be taken
seriously."" Neither the increases under the 1964 amendment nor
those currently proposed in H.R. 1 go far to remedy the essential
weakness of the statute as an instrument of policy. The facts of the
Nammack" case, showing an average weekly expenditure of about $55
rather than the $11.54 that the statute allows as deductible, emphasize
the judgment of the minority report that those who considered $11.54
weekly an adequate deduction had "simply lost touch with realities.""
The $900 currently allowed for two or more dependents assumes
weekly costs of about $18, while the $1500 deduction proposed in
H.R. 1 for three or more dependents allows about $29 a week; and
those are the upper limits of deductible expenditure. For the care of
only one dependent, H.R. 1 proposes a deduction of less than $15 a
week, notwithstanding the statement in the committee report which
scope of the expense allowances in the present law suggests that it represents a hardship
subsidy rather than a concern for discrimination as such." Id. at 372 (paper submitted by
White, Proper Income Tax Treatment of Deductions for Personal Expense).
55 S. Rep. No. 1622, supra note 42, at 36 (emphasis added).
R6 See note 51 supra.
07 The changes are summarized at note 44 supra.
58 The reports are cited at note 43 supra. See especially the language of S. Rep.
No. 830 quoted supra note 43; cf. S. Rep. No. 69, supra note 43, at 619, quoting a
Treasury report in support of the 1963 extension of the deduction to deserted wives:
"Since the child care deduction was originally authorized to alleviate the burdens on
families where the mother had to work in order to maintain minimum living standards
. . . it seems inequitable to deprive deserted wives of this form of assistance when they
are in similar circumstances" (emphasis added).
50 See text at notes 72-73 infra.
60 See text at note 65 infra.
01 H.R. No. 231, at note 46 supra.
62 Minority report of H.R. Rep. No. 1337, supra note 39, at B10.
63 See text supra at note 3. Mrs. Nammack claims a deduction of $2860 for a year's
expenses.
64 Minority report of H.R. Rep. No. 1337, supra note 39, at B10.
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recognizes the fact that "since 1954, the cost of child care has in-
creased sharply.""
Other terms of the statute place further limits on its usefulness.
The low-income taxpayer for whose benefit it is intended must itemize
deductions in order to claim the deduction; in all likelihood, he has
insufficient itemized deductions of other kinds, or insufficient records,
to make it worthwhile to utilize itemized deductions in lieu of the
standard deduction." Moreover, the actual dollar saving to the low-
income taxpayer claiming this or any other personal deduction is
minimal because the lower the marginal tax rate, the lower will be the
tax saving. A table presented to the Senate in 1954" shows that the
$600 deduction would save an employee earning $5000 only about
$126, while an employee with an income of $10,000 would profit con-
siderably more.
Arguably, however, these inadequacies are merely threshold prob-
lems. It could be claimed that the essential weakness of the deduction
is that as part of tax law it cannot provide more than peripheral relief
05
 H. R. Rep. No. 231, supra note 46 at 236.
00
 Balch, in Appraisal of Personal Deductions (a paper submitted to the Tax Re-
vision Compendium, supra note 54), summarizes the disadvantages suffered by "ordinary
citizens" in taking itemized deductions and the consequently regressive distribution of
the benefits of personal deductions. Tax Revision Compendium, supra note 54, at 435-36.
Balch evaluates the child care deduction specifically: "Extremely few tax returns are
able to claim this benefit, and most of these would pay no tax with or without the
deduction. It is a very complicated section to apply, . . . and most taxpayers who meet
the special tests imposed by this section do not itemize their deductions anyway." Id. at
438.
67
TABLE 11.—Comparison of the individual income tax liability for a widow with 1
child under present law and under H.R. 8300 assuming pm child care expenses





resulting from— Total reduction     
Head of
Child	 house-
Net income (after	 care	 hold
deductions but	 Present	 H.R.	 pro-	 pro-
before exemptions)	 law	 8300 1
	vision	 vision	 Amount	 Percent
$1,500 $60
— $60 — $60 100.0
$2,000 160 $40 120 — 120 75.0
$3,000 360 240 120 — 120 33.3
$4,000 568 440 126 $2 128 22.5
$5,000 778 640 126 12 138 17.7
$8,000 1,508 1,284 156 68 224 14.9
$10,000 2,060 1,732 180 148 328 15.9
Assuming taxpayer itemizes deductions.
Hearings Before the Senate Comm. on Finance, 83d Cong., 2d Sess. 25 (1954).
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to the social need involved. It might also be argued that the deduction
may even obscure the need for positive action to resolve the dilemma
of the individual who must work, but whose dependents need care
that she, or he, cannot afford to pay others to provide.
The family assistance program in Title IV of H.R. 1 recognizes
this dilemma by proposing free day-care centers for the children of a
parent learning a skill." Under this bill, once that parent is employed,
she would have to pay for the care, but costs could be deducted from
earnings which otherwise would be used to reduce family benefits."
As a result, her net income would be minimally affected so long as she
remained in an income bracket qualifying her for family assistance.
In comparison, the proposed amendment of Section 214 in Title V of
H.R. 1 offers little dollar saving to taxpayers whose income is low,
but above the family assistance level, and minimal help to those who
cannot find extremely inexpensive care. It does offer a windfall to
those single working women taxpayers with high incomes. Hence, both
that proposal and the present statute represent tax expenditures that
wastefully subsidize some who do not need the subsidy while failing
to provide adequate help to many intended beneficiaries." Both would
appear to be ineffective instruments of the explicit policy behind
section 214 and consequently of those general tax policies favoring full
employment and economic growth.
One more anomaly is suggested by the pending amendment's pro-
posal to raise from $6000 to $12,000 the joint income limit below
which a working couple may take a full deduction.n The committee
report recognizes the latter figure as somewhat above the current
median family income." This change suggests growing congressional
recognition of the right of women generally to work, since, for the first
time, a full deduction would be made available to a family with a
relatively comfortable income. The anomaly arises from the still un-
realistically low dollar limits on the amount of the deduction; unless
the true cost of child care is deductible, such cost will remain an
obstacle to most women's exercise of their right to work outside the
home. Thus, the bill fails as much to implement any new intention to
extend women's rights as it does to carry out the original policy.
IV. POSSIBLE ALTERNATIVES
One alternative to inadequacies in the present statute, a proposal
based on the imputed income theory, was presented to Congress in
1959:
08 H. R. Rep. No. 231, supra note 46, at 166-67.
00 Id. at 167-68, 354.
70
 This supposition is supported by the fact, noted in S. Rep. No. 830, supra note
43, at 1741, that in 1960 only 244,000 returns claimed the deduction; 117,000 of these
were joint returns. Cf. Balch, supra note 66. The thirteen bills filed in the 92d Congress
to amend 214 (see supra note 7) are indicative of widespread current dissatisfaction
with the terms of the statute.
71 See note 8 supra.
72 H. R. Rep. No. 231, supra nnte 46, at 237.
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' The equity issue posed by child care expense . . . stems
ultimately from a lack of imputation—in this case for the
income in kind generated by personal services rendered
within the home. Were the imputation made, then the tax
differential would be reduced or eliminated from the choice
confronting the mother as to whether to earn income by
selling services outside the home or by performing services
within. . . ."
However, the practical difficulties of imputation, particularly those
regarding evaluation of domestic services, would seem to limit its
usefulness as a remedy for the deficiencies of section 214.'
A more practical alternative is suggested by congressional treat-
ment of the moving expense deduction, Section 217 of the Code." Like
section 214, 217 covers expenses inherently personal; like 214, it con-
stitutes an exception to the general rule of section 262. The policy
reasons behind it are the promotion of labor mobility and, hence, the
reduction of local structural unemployment." In 1969 Congress
throughly liberalized the terms of the deduction, allowing all reasonable
expenses of moving, plus up to $1000 for indirect expenses such as
househunting trips, to be deducted by all taxpayers moving to a new
principal place of work." The House report gave as reasons for the
liberal allowance both the labor mobility policy and the fact that
"Esjubstantial moving expenses often are incurred by taxpayers in
connection with employment-related moves. Moreover, in an im-
portant sense, these expenses may be viewed as a cost of earning
income."78
Through this legislation moving expenses were implicitly recog-
nized as quasi-business expenses and thus accorded deductibility sub-
ject only to the requirement of reasonableness. The wording of the
House report suggests a congressional determination that the amount
of the expense incurred required treating it in this way if section 217
were to be an effective tool of policy. The personal nature of the
expense is recognized in that it remains a Part VII deduction; but
73 White in Tax Revision Compendium, supra note 54, at 371; see also Tax Revision
Compendium at 403 (paper submitted by H. Kahn, Personal Deductions in the Individual
Income Tax), for a discussion of imputation as a relief from the inequities of the present
personal interest deduction. The imputation argument is developed with reference
to the child care deduction in Note, Sex and the Single Man: Discrimination in the
Dependent Care Deduction, 5 Valpariso L. Rev. 415, 437-38 (1971).
74 White in Tax Revision Compendium, supra note 54, at 372, admits "the im-
practicability of imputation in this case."
76 Int. Rev. Code of 1954, § 217.
76 S. Rep. No. 830, supra note 43 at 1744; H. R. Rep. No. 91-413, 91st Cong., 1st
Sess. (1969), U.S. Code Cong. & Ad. News 1721 (1969).
77 Pub. L. 91-172, tit. II, § 231(a), 83 Stat. 577 (1969). The new place of employ-
ment must be at least 50 miles away from the old residence or place of work. Int. Rex
Code § 217(c) (1 ) .
78 H. R. Rep. No. 413, supra note 76, at 1721 (emphasis added).
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the terms areessentially those accorded business expenses. Moreover,
the deduction is taken from gross income, precisely as in a business
expense, so that the individual claiming it may take a standard deduc-
tion as well."
The child care expense is analogous to moving costs as an in-
herently personal expense whose "substantial" size would appear to
require deductibility subject only to reasonableness, if congressional
policy is to be carried out with even moderate effectiveness. Thus the
case for amendment of section 214 in a manner similar to that of
section 217 appears reasonable. If the congressional intention con-
tinues to be to provide relief primarily for taxpayers who must work
in order to earn a livelihood, the deduction could be allowed only to
those whose income is so low that employment is clearly a means of
livelihood rather than a means of bringing home luxuries, or livelihood
plus luxuries. Relief would be afforded, in other words, to persons
whom Congress intends to subsidize. Should congressional concern for
equality of the sexes so dictate, men in taxpayer Mortiz' class could
also be included.
Such modification of the child care deduction would appear to
provide a far more, effective instrument of policy than either the cur-
rent statute or the pending amendment, and would cause less squander-
ing of tax expenditures in that only the intended beneficiaries of the
subsidy could claim the deduction." Admittedly, allowing the deduc-
tion on such terms' would not reach the central problem, that of
adequately meeting the day-care needs of the low-income, full-time
worker. Still further liberalization of those terms, however, could
provide meaningful dollar savings and simultaneously make the
subsidy sufficiently visible to create a constant reminder of the need
for more positive action. Such a liberalization would allow all reason-
able costs of child care as a tax credit; or, alternatively, it could allow
deduction of those costs from gross income, on exactly the same terms
79 Int. Rev. Code of 1954, § 62(2) (8).
99
 Another advantage is essentially metaphysical. Conceptually, of course, child
care expenses must always be personal in that they originate ab initio from a personal/
family need. Nonetheless, Congress would eliminate much of the element of personal
choice in the incurring of the expense by restricting the deduction to those whose
income is so low that they virtually cannot choose to stay home to care for dependents
if some alternative provision for that care is made. Compare the language of the
Treasury Department recommending a limit of $1500 on "indirect" moving expenses:
Direct expenses ... would continue to be deductible without a dollar limitation.
The $1,500 limitation on indirect expenses will provide the needed relief .. •
for the great majority of employees; that is, employees with average earnings
and average moving expenses. Total expenses for these indirect costs may
exceed the limitation in cases of high-income employees. Their added costs
are attributable to their higher standard of living which their increased earn-
- ing power makes possible and should therefore properly be considered as per-
sonal rather than business related (emphasis added).
U.S. Treasury Department, Tax Reform Studies and Proposals, Joint Publication of House
Comm. on Ways and Means and Senate Comm. on Finance, 91st Cong., Ist Sess., pt. 1,
216'(1969).
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accorded a business or moving expense deduction, and so permit the
taxpayer to take a standard deduction as well. Such a liberalization
would of course increase tax expenditures. However, the legislative
history of the statute emphasizes social need rather than limitation of
tax expenditures, and insofar as the deduction could be made an effec-
tive policy instrument, its stimulation of employment could increase
tax revenue.
CONCLUSION
Judicial relief for the inadequacies of the child care deduction
statute does not appear to be available, either through reclassification
of the expense as a business/trade expense or by a finding of a denial
of due process. However, judicial focus upon inadequacies and in-
equities in tax law, and on the courts' inability to grant relief, has
prompted legislative remedy in the past. 8' The Nammack and Moritz
cases provide an opportunity for such focus, particularly since
Congress is now considering an amendment to section 214 that fails to
correlate its terms with the announced policy behind the statute and
with the general tax policy favoring full employment. Even though
the courts cannot, in tax cases, do equity in the interstices of legisla-
tive grace, strong opinions and attendant publicity could serve as
catalysts to effective congressional action.*
ANN Fox
81
 E.g., Lykes v. United States, 343 U.S. 118 (1952) apparently helped to prompt
enactment of 212(3), Int. Rev. Code of 1954. Higgins v. Commissioner, 312 U.S. 212
(1941) was corrected by the Int. Rev. Code of 1939, { 23(a) (2), predecessor of § 212.
See account of the decision and the congressional reaction in Lykes v. United States, 343
U.S. 118, 121 (1952).
• As this comment went to press in mid-November, the Senate Finance Committee
repOrted out, as one of its amendments to H.R. 10947, the Revenue Act of 1971, an
amended version of § 214. Entitled "Expenses for Household and Dependent Care Ser-
vices Necessary for Gainful Employment," the amended section would allow a deduction
of up to $400 a month to an employed individual who maintains a household which in-
cludes at least one dependent child under fifteen or an incapacitated adult dependent.
Expenses for household services unassociated with dependent care would be fully de-
ductible, in contrast to the current regulation which disallows household expenses not
allocable to such care. Treas. Reg. 1.214-1(f)(iii) (1956), amended by T.D. 6740 (1964),
T.D. 6778 (1964), and T.D. 7114 (1971). Indeed, the taxpayer could deduct only $200
for the care of one dependent outside the home, but he could then deduct the remaining
$200 for the services of a maid or cook within the home. A single taxpayer could take
the full deduction regardless of his income; a working married couple would have to
reduce their deduction by one dollar for every two dollars of joint income over $12,000.
S. Rep. No. 437, 92d Cong., 1st Sess. 59-62 (1971); Text of H.R. 10947 as Reported to
the Senate on Nov. 9, 1971, Bill Section 210a.
Brief debate on the Senate floor led to the passage of two additional changes. The
first, which would add a new paragraph (10) to Section 62 of the Code, would allow the
deduction on the same terms as a business expense and so permit the taxpayer to take
a standard deduction as well. 117 Cong. Rec. 18,396-398 (daily ed. Nov. 12, 1971). The
second would allow the full deduction to working couples with a joint income of $18,000;
thus, income would have to be $27,600 before all relief is phased out. 117 Cong. Rec.
18,550-555 (daily ed. Nov. 15, 1971).
Since the committee report and debates deserve evaluation more precise than can be
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made within the limits of an asterisk note, only two observations are submitted here.
First, the report shows a legislative intent (1) to help "families with one working adult
or families with two adults where the income level is such that both must obtain em-
ployment," and (2) to provide "employment opportunities for persons presently having
difficulty in this respect." S. Rep. No. 437, 92d Cong., 1st Sess. 4, 60 (1971). The latter
"persons," presumably, are those who will seek jobs as domestic workers rather than
remain on welfare; the Finance Committee is offering jobs instead of dollar savings to
those low-income persons for whom the enlarged deduction will provide almost no actual
savings. It does so by offering large subsidies for maid service as well as dependent care
to high-income single taxpayers and, after the floor amendment, to couples with joint
incomes in the $20,000 range. Even before the floor amendment was passed, the Treasury
had estimated that the new deduction would result in tax expenditures—in the form of
lost revenue—of $21 million going to taxpayers with incomes of over $20,000. S. Rep. No.
437, at 21. Indeed, Senator Long admitted in floor debate that the Committee had been
surprised to find that the amendment would cost less than bad been anticipated because
"people at this income level [$12,000] cannot afford to hire people at $400 a month. . . .
When you get up to about $18,000, you are getting to people who can afford to fully use
the $400 deductions. . ." It was after this debate that the Senate raised the beginning
of phase-out to $18,000. 117 Cong. Rec. 18,551 (daily ed. Nov. 15, 1971).
Thus, to accomplish its initial intent, the Senate is offering an amendment whose
broad terms give maximum direct help, in thel form of dollar savings, to high-income
taxpayers. True, the amendment would allow lower-income families to take a more
reasonable deduction than they now may, and a standard deduction as well; but, as
Senator Long stated, low- and even middle-income families will not need a $400 deduc-
tion. In opposition, representing the Treasury's point of view, Senator Bennett noted that
people with incomes of over $18,000 "probably already have their child care arranged.
So, this is just a nice windfall for [them]. . • ." Id. at 18,554. Should that be true, fewer
new domestic jobs than Senator Long anticipates will be created. Accordingly, it is
submitted—assuming that such goals are to be pursued by tax rather than direct ex-
penditures—that the Senators would have effected both of their initial intentions more
efficiently, and with less waste of tax expenditures, by giving direct help in the form of
a tax credit for child care expenses to low- and middle-income workers.
The second observation is prompted by the debates; they revealed senatorial ac-
ceptance of Mrs. Nammack's classification of child care costs as a business expense. On
two NBC network television news programs in early November, she had argued that such
costs were as fully business expenses as was David Rockefeller's expenditure for a secre-
tary. The senators referred to her argument several times, with approval. Id. at 18,550-551.
They did not question it on grounds of long-established tax policy denying deduction of
even business-related personal expenses. Senator Long stated that "[w]hen you accept
the logic of that argument [the analogy between a babysitter and a Rockefeller secretary],
as the Senate has done," it "does not make much sense" to cut off the deduction at the
$12,000 level. Id. at 18,551. It is submitted, and the Senator came close to admitting, that
by the foregoing logic it does not make much sense to cut off the deduction at any level.
Rather, if the expenses are business costs, they should be deductible, subject only to
reasonableness, by employed taxpayers of all income levels. Indeed, the household help
costs not attributable to dependent care should be deductible by all workers, not just
those whose homes "include" a child or incapacitated dependent. Finally, commuting,
clothing and other employment-related though personal expenses deserve comparable
treatment.
On December 4, in an action for which the report is not available as this note is
written, the Conference Committee accepted the Senate amendment with two modifica-
tions. The first required that the deduction be itemized; that is, the taxpayer who would
claim it must forego the standard deduction as he does under the current statute. The
second applied the $18,000 income limit, beyond which phase-out starts, to all taxpayers,
not just to the working married couple.
The first modification implies rejection of the business characterization given to the
deduction by the Senate floor amendment and so accords with traditional tax policy that
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would classify the expense as personal. Its practical effect, however, is to deny the de-
duction to many lower-income taxpayers for whom the deduction is primarily intended,
and hence to limit the creation of new jobs in those taxpayers' households. The second
modification accords with classification of the deduction as a social welfare subsidy to
taxpayers whose restricted incomes qualify them for special treatment. This change will
reduce waste by denying the subsidy to single heads of households who have high in-
comes but who hitherto have qualified for the deduction because of their single status.
On the other hand, this modification underlines the inefficiency that the first change would
produce: that is, if the deduction is a subsidy rather than a business expense to which
all are entitled, why deny it, by requiring itemization, to many of the low-income tax-
payers most in need of that subsidy?
Statistics estimating the effect of the deduction as it emerged from Conference Com-
mittee projected a total tax expenditure of $145 million in 1972, of which $64 million
represents loss of revenue from taxpayers with individual incomes over $15,000. See Con-
ference changes tabulated in 117 Cong. Rec. 12,120, Table 3 (daily ed. Dec. 9, 1971).
Returns showing incomes over $15,000 formed about 8.8% of total taxable and nontaxable
returns submitted in 1968. Internal Revenue Service, Statistics of Income 1968, Individual
Income Tax Returns 7, Table 1.2 (1970). Accordingly, the deduction, as reported out of
Conference Committee, would give about 44% of the tax expenditure of $145 million to
less than 9% of the nation's taxpayers. it is submitted that the inefficiency and inequity
suggested by this statistic, and by the criticisms given above, are inherent in congressional
attempts to use tax law to pursue goals that may be better achieved by direct legislation.
288
